Kurdistan Democratic Party's Convention: Outcomes, Challenges, and the Future

(KDP party delegates voting in the party’s convention in Dohuk. Courtesy of Rudaw.net)

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the major ruling party in the Kurdistan Region (KR) in Iraq, finished its 14th party congress on November 6th. Some interesting developments have taken place inside the party. Masoud Barzani, who has led the KDP since 1979, was reinstated in his position as the president of the party. Barzani told party delegates that despite staying on for another term, he wishes to retire from the position of his volition at some (unspecified) point and not due to death. His nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, who also serves as the president of the KR, maintained his position as the deputy president (vice-president) of the party. But Nechirvan now has to share some of his powers with Masrour Barzani, his cousin and the incumbent prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—Masrour is the son of Masoud Barzani. Up until this congress, Nechirvan held the party’s sole position of deputy president. The three-day event was held in Dohuk and was attended by 1,023 party delegates. Apart from the top three senior positions (the president and his two deputies), a 51-member Central Committee was also elected. Ten of the central committee members were recommended directly by Masoud Barzani and approved through a unanimous show of hands of party delegates. These ten individuals have been longtime KDP officials and/or confidantes of Masoud Barzani (Fuad Hussein and Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s current and former foreign ministers, were among this group). One reason this group of ten did not go through the secret balloting procedure set for electing Central Committee members could be concerns about them not being able to win enough votes. But the remaining 41 central committee members were chosen through secret balloting, leading to some unexpected outcomes. For instance, 12 of the former Leadership Council members of the KDP did not gain sufficient votes to make it to the new central committee. Also, a group of individuals who had recently joined the KDP from other rival parties such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran (Change) Movement did not gain sufficient votes to make it to the Central Committee. This could be a subtle message by the KDP delegates that these new individuals did not have the demonstrated party loyalty or credentials that would entitle them to seats in the party’s Central Committee (though some of these individuals claimed to have had the support of senior members of the Barzani family).

There is an interesting detail here as well pertaining to the power struggle between Nechirvan and Masrour. Media outlets close to Nechirvan Barzani call him “the first deputy president” of the KDP, indicating that Masrour is the second deputy president and hence occupies a lower rank in the party’s hierarchy. In contrast, media outlets close to Masrour Barzani refer to his position as simply “the deputy president”, meaning he is a co-equal of Nechirvan Barzani. This is a significant indicator of internal rivalries and the maneuvering that is ongoing at the higher echelons of the party to succeed Masoud Barzani should the office of party president become vacant, regardless of the cause. Many have viewed the KDP congress as an opportunity to officially consolidate the ascending role of Masrour Barzani within the party. Masrour has been highly ambitious and has practically been the leading figure within the KDP after his father for the past decade or so even though his party rank was officially lower than Nechirvan (he is seen as his father’s closest aide and advisor). Masrour Barzani first established his stature as the top security figure of the KR and KDP and has now extended his role to the executive branch of the government. In terms of the degree of support that each of these two figures now enjoys within the KDP, of the 51 members of the party’s new central committee, one could count less than a handful with loyalties to Nechirvan. The rest could be said to be supporters of Masrour or in some cases undetermined and hedging their bets for the eventual decisive moment. All in all, Masrour is well poised to outmaneuver his cousin for the party’s leadership in the future, barring an unexpected turn of events such as pressures from regional states to have Nechirvan serve as the party’s leader. This matter, despite typical simplifications here and there, is more complex than it appears--I’ll explain this later in the piece.

While both Nechirvan and Masrour are committed to keeping the KDP in its powerful position as the leading party in the KR, they have their differences of approach. Masrour is often perceived as less compromising and more aggressive in dealing with other parties in Kurdistan. He is also more disciplined and organized in handling party or government affairs. Nechirvan, on the other hand, has tried to project an image of a flexible politician, more accommodating and willing to engage with all sides, often opting for dialogue and middle-of-the-road solutions. Some see this as a classic good cop-bad cop game by Nechirvan and Masrour strategically aimed at advancing the party’s interests depending on the exigencies of a particular situation. This reading, however, tends to view the KDP and the Barzani family as a monolith. The party’s history and present circumstances challenge such a perception. The differences in approach between the two figures are reflective of the power struggle for the future leadership of the party and how they are positioning themselves in that regard both internally (within the party) and on the broader Kurdish and Iraqi domains.

Individual rivalries aside, the KDP congress/convention was highly notable as the official culmination of a process that became more pronounced in the late 1990s or mid-2000s to assert the uncontested control of the Barzani family over the KDP (some might even date back the process to mid-late 1970s when the party experienced a deep internal fracture). At no point in the 76-year history of the KDP, the Barzani family has been the unchallenged leading nucleus of the party in the manner that it is today. Indeed, since its foundation in 1946 up until the early 1960s, the KDP leadership had a very diverse make-up, whether in terms of the geographical area that its leaders hailed from or their tribal and ideological backgrounds and orientations. This resulted in a largely consultative decision-making process within the party with various power centers. But starting from the early 1960s, the Barzani family under the late Malla Mustafa Barzani came to gradually dominate decision-making within the KDP. Despite the growing role of the Barzani family, the KDP still maintained a diverse composition whether in its politburo or in the form of the deputy-president position which was occupied by a non-Barzani as recently as 2010 (though in a symbolic capacity for most of that period). Today, the Barzani family’s authority over the KDP is solidified in an unprecedented and secure manner. If the KDP, and the PUK, have not allowed a democratic institutionalization of Kurdistan’s politics, they have certainly managed to successfully institutionalize family control within their respective parties and beyond. 

The KDP Now and in the Future

The current moment in KDP history is noteworthy for various reasons. In Iraq, no other party as the KDP has probably faced so many enemies, often trying to violently destroy it. It’s fair to say that no other party in Iraq has had the depth and strategic survival talents and skills of the KDP for so long. The Communists and Baathists who were once dominant either numerically or in terms of power are now gone for the most part. The main Shia powerhouse, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic party of the al-Hakim family (which now has a new name) has been reduced to a shadow of its former self. Even the Dawa Party and its mutations are not a close competitor for the KDP in the political marathon of survival in Iraq’s contemporary history. The KDP has been adept at adjusting to shifting circumstances and maintaining its status as a player to reckon with for three-quarters of a century. Its resilience in the face of all odds is astonishing, to say the least. Ironically, while criticized by many for its family essence, the existence of a largely cohesive family at its core has certainly been an important factor behind its survival (this reminds one of Ibn Khaldun and his notion of ‘asabiyya or the necessity of family/dynastic solidarity at the helm of a power circle to ensure stability and continuity). 

Yet the KDP is a strong party on a shaky foundation. This is a paradoxical proposition but, if you bear with me, I’ll clarify. The KDP is strong because today it’s a quite coherent party thanks to its centralized leadership and decision-making, and the weight it carries in the Kurdish and Iraqi political arenas. It is now the largest Kurdish political party, almost twice the size of its closest historical rival the PUK (historical caveat, as recently as the 2005 elections, the PUK had actually more individual votes than the KDP among Kurds voting in Iraq). With some generosity, the KDP could be even described as the party with the highest number of parliamentary seats in Iraq currently (31 seats). It competed as a stand-alone party in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections (not as part of any coalition as Maliki’s State of Law did for example, or a loose religious-political movement/network like the Sadrists). The KDP also enjoys a broad network of regional and international relations and connections that it can to some extent rely on for its survival (particularly Turkey and the Gulf Arab states). 

But this strength rests on a shaky foundation for a number of reasons. Internally, as explained above, under the current appearance of strength, there is a power struggle raging between Nechirvan and Masrour. Though the latter has effectively sidelined the former since the party’s 13th convention in 2010, the struggle is still ongoing in some intensity. As to whether this will erupt into an all-out conflict of the sort that we’re currently seeing within the PUK and the Talabani family, one cannot really say anything with certainty (I’ll explain more below). Another reason why the KDP stands on a shaky foundation is if we broaden our conception of such a foundation to the level of Iraqi and regional (geo)politics, Iran and the partly-armed and partly-political Shia groups that it controls have been trying to undermine, or perhaps more apt to say destroy, the KDP through a variety of measures (whether direct missile and drone attacks or by trying to dry up its sources of revenue and governance, i.e. oil and gas). Iran and its Iraqi allies, which happen to be now the main bloc in charge of the Iraqi government, don’t trust the KDP and view it as aligned with countries and groups that oppose Iranian hegemony in Iraq and beyond. One should not even rule out some sort of future Iranian (or Iran-instigated) invasion against the Kurdistan Region and particularly the KDP as its main governing party, either directly through its own military branches, or indirectly through its Iraqi proxies, or probably a creative mix of the two as we saw in 2017 in the aftermath of the Kurdistan independence referendum. The current unrest inside Iran, and the Iranian regime’s (bogus) accusations of exiled Kurdish opposition parties based in the KR being behind the protests in Iran, could just provide the perfect excuse for Tehran to go for this option and hit several birds with one stone.

Now to the question of the internal KDP rivalries again. Kurdish news and social media are frequently rife with speculations, sometimes presented as tidings and other times as warnings, of some sort of doomsday scenario awaiting the KDP as a result of its internal rivalries. No one can certainly rule out an eventuality of this nature. But it wouldn’t be far-fetched to suggest that a likely outcome (and I emphasize “a” here) could be that Masrour and Nechirvan will maintain a working relationship and division of labor within and outside the party that would keep them and the KDP together. Here is why this could happen. The KDP is closely watching what is happening inside the PUK and how the party has been suffering from the conflict between the two wings of the Talabani family and its other power centers. The KDP is also well aware that they have many enemies within Kurdistan, Iraq, and the broader region who would use any serious internal conflict within the party to undermine and even possibly fracture it into various mini-parties. In other words, precisely because of these reasons, Nechirvan and Masrour might gradually work out a modus vivendi whereby-- despite occasional ups and downs, differences, rivalries, and even hostilities-- they would keep the party functioning and under one roof (despite cracks here and there). Nechirvan appears resigned to such an eventuality now as, despite his diminishing control within the party, he still plays a considerable role through the KDP on the Kurdistan and Iraqi stages. Other routes will be more or less destructive for the KDP. Apart from its major political role in Kurdistan and Iraq, there is also the question of large business interests that the KDP and its senior leadership hold and need to protect. This last factor could induce more pragmatism and caution in managing intra-family/party rivalries. While depending on the degree of pressure by the dominant side and the willingness of the other side to respond and resist, the KDP could experience a different fate, the scenario I’ve laid out here should not be discounted as it has been mostly the norm so far and could continue into the foreseeable future. In other words, the two prominent faces of the KDP are co-dependent and cannot do without each other, at least in the short and medium run.

The KDP Model

The KDP has historically had many detractors. The more educated, urban sections of the Kurdish society, particularly those who later built the PUK or Gorran, always attacked the KDP for being a party family. This rhetoric against the KDP was arguably the major rallying cry of its opponents and their main source of legitimacy and appeal. But with the PUK and other parties turning into cloned versions of the KDP, to varying degrees of course, the KDP now feels vindicated (the PUK is now a family enterprise. Gorran is dominated by the sons of its late leader, Nawshirwan Mustafa. The New Generation is another such example. And Islamist groups increasingly revolve around families too, with the exception of the Ikhwani-oriented Kurdistan Islamic Union). Family and dynastic politics is now a defining feature of the Kurdistan Region’s politics. But the KDP has been sincere for the past half century with its members and the larger Kurdish society in terms of what it is and how it envisions going about its party business. The dominant role of the Barzani family and their centrality to the party’s hierarchy, decision-making, and survival is no longer concealed or contested internally. In other words, anyone joining the KDP, regardless of their reasons and motives, knows pretty well how the party operates, who runs it, and where they should draw the line insofar as the limits of their personal ambitions are concerned. While one might instinctively think this is rejected by the public, the answer is again more nuanced.

The KDP model, as I shall call it here for clarity and brevity, should be looked at through the broader social-political context within which it operates. The model has significant appeal for many not just within the party’s ranks but also beyond. On the one hand, the continuity represented in KDP’s family-centered leadership generates considerable levels of familiarity, stability, and predictability as far as the broader tumultuous politics of Iraq and the region are concerned and allow. In a country of quick shifts, constant threats to the safety and security of its citizens, and rampant corruption on all levels (widespread in the KDP ranks and Kurdistan’s party and governing structures too), the centralized structure of the KDP and its decision-making-- plus its models of economic development (mainly focused on shiny residential and business towers and road projects), and comparatively more efficient governance (of course strictly compared to other groups in Kurdistan and Iraq) -- represents something that is in high demand, yet short supply in today’s Iraq. The KDP certainly has its own ills, yet it is seen as more predictable, and one could cautiously say reliable in that sense, than others in its bargain with the population under its rule (again not romanticizing things here and speaking in highly comparative terms). It can deliver a certain level of economic development and stability despite the many challenges it grapples with. Judging cautiously from social media, there exists a relatively positive attitude toward the KDP model, particularly more apparent in the Arab parts of Iraq where the population is highly exhausted by uncontrollable chaos on top of seemingly infinite corruption and hopelessly inefficient governance (one can see similar sentiments emerging among social media users in Sulaimani and PUK-dominated areas of Kurdistan too). From this narrowly comparative perspective, the KDP model, though not democratic, represents something better, though certainly not ideal, to many Iraqis and to a lesser extent Kurds; something that is, at least, minimally positive, and tangibly so. This is of course not a scientifically-reached conclusion but one, that I believe, has some significant basis in reality as far as one could gather through longtime observation of social media trends and sentiments in Iraq and Kurdistan.

But this KDP model also has many opponents. As demonstrated by the rise of a strong oppositional current (crystalized into an organized party in the form of Gorran for some years), the KDP model is rejected by large swaths of Kurdish society. Crucially, many among the younger generation frown upon such a model of party structure and activity. They do not accept the idea that blood rather than meritocracy should be the driver of status and position within a political party. They view such a model as self-serving, undemocratic, and ultimately incompatible with the objectives of the Kurdish struggle for freedom and justice over the past century or so. The dynastic party structure and politics model ties social mobility to party loyalty and reserves certain influential positions only for certain individuals within a specific family circle. It fails to recognize and meet the growing needs of Kurdish youths for better economic opportunities, political rights, and social mobility. It is not prepared to and cannot deal with the youth bulge problem it is faced with. The oppositional sentiment among the youth, if growing to become the basis of a rejuvenated political platform, carries within itself a serious potential for positive political change, but only under the right circumstances. The structural capacity of Kurdish, Iraqi, and regional politics for ambitious change is quite limited at least for the foreseeable future, but if leveraged strategically and patiently/properly, it could produce some positive outcomes. I will tend to this subject in greater length in a future piece.

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